

Carl E. Duckett, Director, FMSAC. Memo for DD/S&T,
29 January 1964, [REDACTED]
Subj: Background Information for FMSAC Discussions

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1. During past 2 mos discussions held w/various elements of DOD re FMSAC and its msn. These indicate consid diff of opin as to effectiveness of current missile and space analysis effort. While some DOD personnel agree improvements are needed, others feel that there are no serious problems. Those who admit deficiencies tend to support view that a little fixing of present resources will solve the problem; thus they question the need for FMSAC.

2. Based on our recent review of this matter I have attempted to re-evaluate the situation. I have talked to a no. of OSI & FMSAC analysts, contractor personnel, members of GMAIC, and have visited NSA. Based on these inputs and my own background knowledge, I am convinced that we will never sell FMSAC on the basis of fixing specific problem areas. The two primary reasons are (1) it is impossible to document many of the past foul-ups, and (2) many changes have been made which DOD contends has or will correct the recognized shortcomings. The most significant org changes cited are formation of DIA and org of the SMAC at NSA. Since SMAC is just a year old and the D&T element of DIA was activated only a few months ago, it seems clear that any reference to deficiencies which date back more than one year will result in a counter argument that the problem has now been solved. This argument has been used in most of the conversations I have had with DOD representatives. Naturally I don't buy their argument but I don't believe it is worthwhile to engage it. For any future debates on FMSAC, I recommend that we stick to a discussion of the present situation and restrict our examples of problem areas to those which have occurred in the past few months.

3. To me the most important evidence of the need for improved analysis is a review of missile and space intelligence gaps. A list of the more important of these gaps follows:

(Here is a list of 7 probable or existing ^{*Sensitive to the Hosts*} missile-related facilities or areas of information on which the U.S. was lacking in data.)

The above-listed gaps are a small sample of a very long list. In fact, there is no Soviet missile or space system on which we have all the answers needed. Although some of the gaps may result from a lack of collection capability, I believe that a more effective analysis effort can provide many of the answers. It therefore follows that the single most important reason for organizing FMSAC is to reduce the large number of unknowns.

4. A statement we have often made about the present Community effort is that no one agency is doing analysis of all available data. Despite arguments to the contrary, this statement is still true and is the real void which FMSAC will fill. In terms of data base, FTD is probably the nearest thing we have to an all-source shop. With the exception of raw data [redacted] they are doing something with all types of data being collected. I know of no diplomatic way to say what is wrong with FTD's product. The fact is, they almost always seem to get the wrong answer. Since some DIA personnel propose FTD as the all-source Community analysis organization, we must either ignore the proposal or bluntly state that past performance clearly shows a lack of competence to do the job. Configuration of the SS-6, propellants and guidance system of the SS-4, size of the SS-8, are typical of the wrong answers they have produced. It should also be noted that whereas the in-house work at FTD is close to an all-source effort, their contractors [redacted] have been assigned rather narrow fields and are not allowed to do all-source analysis.

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7. Many other specific background stories regarding past mistakes have been investigated but it is diff, if not imposs, to estab enough factual data to make these stories of value in our evaluation. In most cases, several agencies were involved and each has a separate version of what really happened. I have, therefore, concluded that our justification for FMSAC must be based on the big picture and not on the numerous "who struck John" stories. There are many methods which might be effective in solving the problems but based on past performance a "clean up - fix up campaign" in FTD, NSA, or other DOD agencies just won't work.


8. The reasons CIA and FMSAC appear to be the right answer come back to the Director's basic responsibility and need plus CIA's proven ability to attract and keep the caliber of personnel required to do the job.

C.E.D.
Director
FMSAC


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